Optimal Tender Price Selected in the Generalized First Price Position Auction


Position auction is an effective mechanism for search engines to determine the position of advertisement. The search engines let the advertiser specify a single amount as their bid in the auction. This amount is interpreted as the optimal tender price the advertiser is willing to pay per click on its ad. The optimal tender price allows the advertiser obtain maximum expected return in the generalized first price position auction. In this paper, the assume conditions are noted in the position auction base on the Friedman's model and the probability of winning bid model of the position auction is formulated. By the way of maximize the advertiser's expected return, the keyword bid prices selected model is formulated, which allows the advertiser to select the optimal tender price in the generalized first price auction. Simulation results show that the model for the problem of position auction let the advertiser get maximum expect return.

  • Abstract
  • Keywords
  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. The Winning Bidding Probability Model
  • 3. Optimal Tender Price Selected Model in the Generalized First Price Position Auction
  • 4. Numerical Example Generate the Data Randomly
  • 5. Summaries
  • 6. References

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